Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal
Volume 6

Number 1

Article 3

10-1-2008

Patent Infringers, Come Out with Your Hands Up!: Should the
United States Criminalize Patent Infringement?
Noel Mendez
University at Buffalo School of Law (Student)

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffaloipjournal
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Noel Mendez, Patent Infringers, Come Out with Your Hands Up!: Should the United States Criminalize
Patent Infringement?, 6 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 34 (2008).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffaloipjournal/vol6/iss1/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COMMENT
Patent Infringers, Come Out With Your Hands Up!:
Should the United States Criminalize
Patent Infringement?
NOEL MENDEZt
INTRODUCTION

In 2005, the Commission of the European Communities drafted a
proposal that would allow for, among other things, the criminalization of
patent infringement in Europe.' The Commission Proposal argued that
"disparities between the national systems of penalties ... make it difficult
to combat counterfeiting and piracy." 2 Therefore, piracy and counterfeiting
"have become lucrative activities in the same way as other large-scale
criminal activities such as drug trafficking." 3 The United States has also
increased its effort to extend "criminal penalties to various forms of
misappropriation and misuse of intellectual property." 4 In fact, the
Department of Justice maintains that the protection of intellectual property
is vital to both the economic security of the nation and the "creativity and
innovation of entrepreneurs." 5 In the United States, however, there are no

t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, Class of 2009;
B.A. Lehman College, City University of New York. I would like to thank Professors Nina
Cascio and Mark Bartholomew for their guidance and expertise. I would also like to thank
Inessa Shalevich, Keith Gorgos, and Wende Knapp for their assistance. A special thanks to
my friends and family for their love and support. My success in law school is a testament to
their love and sacrifice.
I Commission Proposalfor a European Parliamentand Council Directive on Criminal
Measures Aimed at Ensuring the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, at 3, COM
(2005) 276 final (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/

site/en/com/2005/com2005_0276en01.pdf

[hereinafter Commission Proposal]; see also

FREDERICK M. ABBOTr ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED

WORLD ECONOMY 663-64 (2007); Paul Meller, Odd Coalition Opposes Criminalizing Patent
Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at C4.

2 Commission Proposal,supra note 1, at 2.
3 Id.
4 SHUBHA GHOSH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 981 (2007).
5 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S TASK FORCE
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/20061PTFProgressReport(6-19-06).pdf [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT].
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criminal penalties for patent infringement. 6 Typically, remedies for
infringement here in the United States include injunctive relief,7 damages,8
and the payment of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party." 9 Indeed,
willful patent infringement is penalized through the award of double or
10
treble damages, but not by criminal sanctions.
Yet there is mounting pressure for the United States to cooperate with
other nations because the protection of U.S. patents "has become a greater
priority for the government."''1 In the past, the United States has made
several agreements and treaties with other countries in order to ensure that
U.S. patent holders' intellectual property rights (IPRs) are protected
abroad. 12 These include the Paris Convention, 13 the Patent Cooperation
Treaty, 14 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights. 15 The United States is also a signatory to the Patent Law
Treaty, which was enacted in 2000.16 Furthermore, the North American
Free Trade Agreement, which was not enacted initially for the purpose of
securing IPRs, has also addressed their protection, 17 and the United States
8
is also a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).1
Needless to say, the United States has had to compromise with other

6 ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 1, at 663.

7 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006). See generally H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc.,
820 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (providing a comprehensive analysis of preliminary
injunctions for patent infringement). See also eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 390 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff can seek remedy for patent infringement in the form
of a permanent injunction provided that (1) there has been irreparable injury, (2) the current
remedies available do not adequately compensate the aggrieved party, (3) after comparing
the possible hardships that either party may suffer as a result of granting or not granting the
injunction, a remedy in equity is necessary, and (4) the public's interest is not undermined by
the issuance of the injunction).
8 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
9 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
10 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 227 (1985).
II GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 230.
12 Id.
13 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, availableat http://www.eisil.org/index.php?sid=492188715&id
=556&t=-link details&cat=484.
14 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
15 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/27trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
16 Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047, available at http://www.wipo.int/
export/ sites/www/treaties/en/ip/plt/pdf/trtdocswo038.pdf.
17 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605, available
at http://www.eisil.org/index.php?sid=324668279&id=509&t-linkdetails&cat=479.
18 World Intellectual Property Organization, Member States, http://www.wipo.int/
members/en/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
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sovereignties and intergovernmental organizations in order to succeed in
19
securing inventors' IPRs globally.
This may create problems for the United States, given its history of
"infringing" on patent holders' rights. 20 Placing issues related to eminent
domain aside for a moment, 2 1 the creation of criminal penalties for patent
infringement around the world begs the question: should the U.S.
government (particularly Congress) continue to provide civil remedies for
patent infringement, or should it follow the growing trend within the
international community and create criminal penalties for patent
infringement, and if so, in what ways?
In examining the conflict between United States and international
intellectual property policy as it pertains to the protection of patent holders'
IPRs, I will first provide a short explanation of U.S. patent law, followed by
a discussion regarding the problems the federal government may face if it
were to criminalize patent infringement here in the United States. Finally, I
will address international trends in the enforcement of IPRs and how they
may affect U.S. patent law policy, as well as possible solutions to the
22
problem.
I. U.S. PATENT LAW
A.

23

The Basics

In the United States, the government grants inventors the right to an
inventor's creation in order to "promote the Promote the Progress of
19 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 231. For an illustration of this pressure in the context
of U.S. copyright law, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (noting that
Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act because of international pressure
imposed by the European Union when it directed its member nations to increase the
monopoly granted to authors and to deny copyright protection to those states that failed to
follow suit).
20 Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 172 (1894). Blake Evan Reese points out

that the U.S. government is "immune from liability when they practice a United States
patented process if they do not practice all the steps of the process 'within the United
States."' Blake Evan Reese, Note, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: An International and
Comparative Study of Governments' Rights to "Infringe" Patents in Light of the Federal
Circuit's Recent Interpretationof 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and a Call for Congress to Modernize
the Statute, 4 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 84, 85-86 (2006). According to Reese, the Court in
Schillinger found that the government is immune from a lawsuit for an action "sounding in
tort." Id at 89.
21 Reese, supra note 20, at 89-90.
22 Some maintain that willful patent infringement should be criminalized. See, e.g.,

Harold A. Borland, Comment, The Affirmative Duty to Exercise Due Care in Willful Patent
Infringement Cases: We Still Want It, 6 HOus. Bus. & TAX L.J. 175, 197-98 (2005-2006).
23 For the purposes of this Comment, I will focus primarily on utility patents in order to
provide the reader with a general understanding of U.S. patent law, since utility patents are
the most common of patents. GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 229.
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Science and useful Arts." 24 A patent, then, is granted to "[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,' '2 5 and
protection may extend even to micro-organisms that are man-made (i.e.,
manufactured) and that do not occur in nature. 2 6 The term invention also
29
28
includes discoveries. 2 7 In addition, an invention must be useful, novel,
and non-obvious to someone who is skilled in the art pertaining to the
invention in question. 30 This hypothetical person is akin to the ordinary
person in tort law. 3 1 Several factors that help determine whether a person
has this ordinary skill "include the educational level of the inventor . . .
[the] problems encountered in the art.., prior art solutions to the problem
... rapidity with which innovations are made... [the] sophistication of the
technology [within the art] ... and the educational levels of [other persons]
in the field.' '3 2 To determine whether an invention is non-obvious, courts
typically look at the scope of the prior art, differences between the prior art
and the claim in question, the level of skill of those who practice the
pertinent art, and secondary considerations (including, but not limited to,
the commercial success of the prior art, whether the claimed subject matter
resolves long felt, yet unresolved needs, and the failures of other previous
inventors). 3 3 Although out of favor, federal courts once looked at prior

24 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Many argue that the notion of having intellectual
property rights in creative and inventive works stems from John Locke's philosophy
regarding ownership of one's own labor. GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 1. Locke argues that
"every Man has a Property in his own Person." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT 287 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). As a result, man
owns "[t]he Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands." Id. at 287-88. The right of

ownership over one's own labor, according to Locke, is "unquestionable." Id. at 288.
25
26
27
28
in the
29

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
35 U.S.C. § 100 (2006).
§ 101. Utility, however, has to be substantial, specific, and not useful in the future but
present. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-36 (1966).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). An invention is novel if it is not known or used by others, not

in a printed publication or was patented before. § 102(a). Additionally, an invention is not
considered novel if it was accessible to the public, in public use or for sale for one year or
more prior to the filing date. § 102(b). Finally, those proposing that a particular invention is
not novel because the invention was previously published "must show that prior to the
critical date the [invention] was sufficiently accessible, at least to the public interested in the
art, so that such a one by examining the reference could make the claimed invention without
further research or experimentation.".In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
30 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
31 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 307.

32 Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
33 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (overturning Cuno
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941) where the Court previously held that
an invention was considered non-obvious, and thus protectable, if it exhibited a "flash of
creative genius").
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teachings, suggestions, or the motivation to combine prior art as a test for
non-obviousness, but this approach was determined to be too narrow in its
34
application.
Also, the priority rule in the United States dictates that patent
protection is afforded to the first person to "conceive of an idea and reduce
it to practice with reasonable diligence." 35 Any person attempting to prove
that he has priority over other inventors, then, must show that he reduced
the invention to practice, whereas a person defending against an
infringement action must prove that the plaintiff either (1) did not reduce it
to practice, (2) that he reduced the idea as the junior user to practice himself
before the senior user, or (3) spurred the senior inventor to reduce it to
practice after the senior inventor failed to do so after a long, unexplained
36
and unwarranted delay in the creative process.
B. Patent Prosecution
Once an invention has been deemed worthy of protection, the inventor
must then disclose and claim the subject matter that the patent is to
protect. 37 The application process is known as patent prosecution, and it is
best described as an interactive process between the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) and the inventor. 38 The inventor will put forth
certain claims, and the PTO will either accept or reject them, giving the
inventor many opportunities to amend them as needed. 39 The process is
designed to be rigorous, given that the inventor stands to benefit greatly
from the "quid pro quo of patent protection." 40 This exchange ensures that
the inventor is granted exclusive rights over his invention. 4 1 A patent is said
to be "the grant of a statutory monopoly.., meant to encourage invention
by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by
the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention." 42 Therefore,
there is a "presumption that an inventor is only entitled to a patent when the
public receives something of value in exchange." 4 3 Many scholars believe

34 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
35 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 23 1. See also § 102(g).

36 See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1563-69 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
37 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 316.
38 Id.
39 Id.

40 Id. Ghosh points out that "[t]here is an underlying assumption in patent law that a
period of exclusivity is necessary to balance the costs of innovation and commercial
exploitation." Id. at 228. "Without incentives to insure long-term gain, such as an exclusive
right to use a patented invention, the necessary initial expenditure is unlikely." Id.
41 Id.
42 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
43 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 228.

Fall 2008]

COME OUT WITH YOUR HANDS UP

the notion of the quid pro quo in intellectual property law, whereby an
inventor is granted a monopoly in exchange for public disclosure, is
"outdated,"'44 and that the "metaphor" has been "encroached" upon by the
Eldred case.45 Yet the fact remains, the public interest is served by this
exchange because inventors are encouraged to innovate, and the invention
is published with the PTO for "commercial exploitation" once the patent
expires.

46

In order to successfully prosecute a patent, four conditions must be
47
met. First, the inventor is required to describe the invention in writing.
This is done for three reasons: (1) it places the public in possession of the
patented subject matter, so that the PTO and the courts can determine
whether or not the invention is already known to the public or has been put
to common use, (2) the written requirement warns otherwise innocent
inventors of possible infringement, and (3) it allows future inventors to
make and use the invention. 4 8 The written description requirement is
satisfied if it reasonably conveys the claimed subject matter to other
inventors who are skilled in the art at the time the subject matter is
conveyed.49 A drawing can also satisfy the written description
50
requirement.
Second, the patent application must "enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains. .. to make and use" an invention. 5 1 A claim cannot
be too broad so as to not enable others skilled in the art to be able to use,
replicate, or make the invention. 52 If a subsequent inventor has to engage in
undue experimentation in order to replicate a patent, the patent is deemed
insufficient. 53 Courts consider (1)the amount of experimentation necessary,
(2) what level of guidance or direction the inventor provided in the
application, (3) the lack of examples enclosed in the application, (4) the
character of the invention itself, (5) prior art, (6) the skill level of those who
practice the art, (7) the inherent predictability (or lack thereof) in the art,

44

Id.

45 Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain
Metaphor after Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315 (2004); see also Eldred, v. Ashcroft,

537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003) (holding that the CTEA, which extends copyright protection for
a creative work for the life of the author plus 70 years after his death, is constitutional).
46 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 228.
47 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).

48 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting Evans
v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 433-34 (1822)).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 § 112.
52 Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895).
53 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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and (8) the scope of the claims themselves. 5 4 Enablernent merely
requires
55
that at least one method be described in the patent specification.
Third, a claim has to be clear and concise. 56 A claim has to be definite
so that someone skilled5 7in the art can easily obtain the dimensions of the
claimed subject matter.
Finally, the inventor must "set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention." 5 8 This entails that an inventor
must disclose the best method or process for creating the invention he seeks
to patent. 59 Unlike the enablement requirement, the best mode requirement
looks to the subjective knowledge of the inventor in order to determine
what he or she thought was the best method or process for completing the
invention. 60 The United States is the only country that requires that the best
61
mode of an invention be disclosed.
C. PatentInfringement
The Patent Act provides that "whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefore, infringes the patent." 62 Moreover, "[w]hoever actively
63
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."
Infringement generally requires that a patent claim "covers the alleged
infringer's product or process," but such a determination requires that the
words used in the claim be clearly defined. 64 Therefore, a hearing is
required in order for the court to construe the patent. 6 5 Moreover, the
construction of a patent is a question of law to be determined by the judge,
not a jury. 66 Also, infringement can be done directly or indirectly. 6 7 Direct
54

Id. at 737.

55 Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
56 § 112.

57 Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir.

1986).
58
59

§ 112.
Spectra, 827 F.2d at 1535-36.

60 Id. Courts have often confused the enablement requirement,that requires an objective
analysis of the patent specification, with the best mode requirement, that looks to the
inventor's particular knowledge of the subject at the time he claimed the invention. Id. at
1532.

61 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 344.
62 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).

§ 27 1(b) (encompassing willful infringement).
64 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
65 See Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary Judgment, and Judicial
Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 94 (2005). This hearing is generally known as a
"Markman hearing." Id.at 95.
66 Markman, 517 U.S. at 384.
63
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infringement requires that the patented invention and the alleged infringing
patent be the same. 68 Courts generally agree that direct infringement is very
69
rare.
Indirect infringement, on the other hand, is much more complex.
Indirect infringement, also known as the doctrine of equivalents, dictates
that a patentee may sue an alleged infringer if the infringing device
performs substantially the same function, in substantially the same way,
with substantially the same result. 70 In order to determine this, the court
looks at (1) the patent itself, (2) the prior art, (3) the particular
circumstances of the case, (4) the purpose of the element within the context
of the patent, (5) the element's qualities when combined with the other
claimed elements in the patent, (6) the intended function of the element, and
(7) whether a person skilled in the art would have known that the element in
the patent is interchangeable with one that was not claimed. 7 1 The primary
rationale for the doctrine is to prevent inventors from making insignificant
72
changes to a patent in order to avoid being found liable for infringement.
There is, however, a defense against the invocation of the doctrine of
equivalents. If the patentee was forced to surrender an element in order to
pass PTO scrutiny, he is "estopped" from invoking the doctrine in
74
73
subsequent litigation. This is known as "prosecution history estoppel.",
Unless the patentee is able to prove that at the time of the surrender, an
ordinary person skilled in the art could not have been expected to draft a
claim that would encompass the alleged equivalent element; he cannot
invoke the doctrine to later claim it as part of his invention. 75 In other
words, the patentee has to argue that when he drafted the patent application,
was equivalent to the
he was unable to foresee that the element surrendered
76 There are other defenses as well. 77
element claimed.
Herein lies the problem: how can the United States impose criminal

4, at 356-423.
68 § 271.
69 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
70 Id. at 608.
71 Id. at 609.
72 Id. at 607.
73 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 18-19 (1997).
67 See GHOSH ET AL., supra note

74 Id.
75 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002).
76 Id. at 725.
77 For example, an inventor may not obtain a patent if he abandons his invention because
abandoning the invention would give another inventor the opportunity to work on the subject
matter in question. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (2006). Additionally, an inventor may not obtain a
patent if he, intentionally or otherwise, suppresses or conceals his invention during an
interference. § 102(g)(1). See also Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir.

1996).
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penalties for patent infringement, given that there are numerous variables
that affect the determination of liability? What follows is a discussion of the
different policy rationales for not imposing criminal liability for patent
infringement in this context, as well as an exploration of the potential
burdens that may be placed on the criminal justice system if patent
infringement were criminalized here in the United States.
1I.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PATENT
INFRINGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

In its fourth session, WIPO's Advisory Committee on Enforcement
outlined several policy rationales for not criminalizing patent
infringement. 78 Among other things, the Committee detennined that
Criminal courts are generally speaking not qualified to deal with patent
issues; any given patent may cover many "inventions"; the invalidity of
the patent is the typical defense to infringement; . . . it is virtually
impossible for law enforcement officers . . . to determine whether
any particular product is an infringing product; patent litigation is
expensive; and a significant
percentage of patents is revoked in the
79
course of patent litigation.
Other policy considerations addressed by the Committee include
ambivalent or conflicting attitudes about the protection of IPRs, the general
level of criminality and poor discretionary choices on behalf of government
prosecutors. 80 Furthermore, the Committee stated that what is considered
"patentable" in one nation may not be patentable in another, 8 1 and
recognized that there may be problems regarding who should be prosecuted,
82
I will
the role of the complainant, pleas, conviction, and sentencing.
elaborate on these ideas, as well as show that the policy goals that justify
the punishment of wrongdoers may be wholly incompatible with the policy
rationales for the enforcement of IPRs.

78 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], The Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights by Means of Criminal Sanctions: An Assessment, at 15, WIPO/ACE/4/3
(Nov. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Enforcement Assessment].
79 See id.

80 See id. at 40-41.
81 See id. at 16.
82 See id. at 41-48.
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A. Criminal Courts Are Not Qualifiedto Deal with PatentIssues
The Committee noted that in some common-law countries, the
judiciary is not "qualified to deal with 'technical' matters." 8 3 The Court in
Markman, however, noted that judges (in the United States) have always
construed the language of patents. 84 The majority held that patent
construction requires "special training and practice" that judges who
routinely hear patent cases possess. 85 As a result, they are more adept at
understanding scientific or technical language than the average juror is.86
Assuming that this may be true of Federal Circuit judges (because they
routinely deal with patent infringement cases), 87 federal criminal court
judges may not have the same expertise, given that they hear as many as
90,407 criminal prosecutions in less than a year. 8 8 To add approximately an
additional 2,700 cases to their workload would burden the federal criminal
justice system further. 89 Federal criminal court judges or magistrates at the
trial level simply cannot devote enough time to the scientific complexities
inherent in patent infringement cases, in addition to their regular
workload. 90
B. Any Given Patent May Cover Many "Inventions"
As discussed earlier, an element claimed in a patent is not limited to
what is literally written in the application. 9 1 A claimed element may have
several equivalents, some of which may not be known at the time an
application is filed with the PTO. 92 Because language is imperfect for
capturing the elements of an invention, courts do not enforce the language
of the claim literally in order to estop the patentee from claiming the
equivalent as part of the patented subject matter; they rely on prior art to
determine if the potentially infringing invention is, in fact, equivalent to the

83 See id. at 40.
84 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996).

85 Id. at 388-89.
86 Id.
87 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 230. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears

patent appeals. Id.
88

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL

JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002 at 1, 9 (2004) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS], available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs02.pdf.
89

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

THEFT, 2002 at 7 (2004) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT], available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipt02.pdf.
90 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 354 (noting that "litigated patents ... tend to be more

complex" and "take longer to prosecute").
91 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002).
92 Id. at 738, 740-41.
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claimed invention. 93 Given the considerable leeway courts adopt in
construing patents, the imposition of a criminal penalty for patent
infringement may severely curtail trial courts' authority to effectively
resolve disputes: there would be no room for settlements, injunctions, or
other remedies.
C. Invalidatinga Patent is the Typical Defense to Infringement
The Patent Act states that a patent is invalid if it fails to comply with
any of the requirements imposed by the Act itself.94 Criminal penalties,
then, should not be adopted in the context of patent infringement because
the process itself, historically speaking, is already rigorous, despite the
95
recent trend of courts holding patents valid.
D. It is Virtually Impossiblefor Law Enforcement Officers to Determine
Whether Any ParticularProduct is An InfringingProduct
Law enforcement personnel are generally trained in the authority to
arrest, criminal procedures (including search warrant requirements, their
exceptions, arrest warrants, and custodial interrogations), the penal law
(including crimes against persons, property and crimes against the
maintenance of public order), and other matters that relate to the
administration of criminal justice. 9 6 They may not, however, be trained in
the sciences or any other technical matters. 9 7 Therefore, they may not have
expertise in scientific matters. 98 As such, they may not be qualified to make
a detennination, based on probable cause, 9 9 that a person is infringing a

93 Id. at 738.
94 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
95 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 230.
96 See generally N.Y. POLICE DEP'T,
author); N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, PATROL GUIDE
97 See id. Law enforcement personnel
techniques or certain computer or scientific

POLICE STUDENT'S GUIDE (2004) (on file with
(2006) (on file with author).
may be well versed in electronic surveillance
technologies (as they relate to the administration

of criminal justice), but the level of training required in order to understand scientific
principles relating to certain patentable subject matter may be far greater than what an agent
possesses. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, dictates that persons with
backgrounds in the physical sciences are eligible for the position of "special agent," but does
not stipulate whether an advanced degree is required. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI
Special Agent Critical Skills, http://www.fbijobs.gov/lll2.asp#9 (last visited Dec. 21,

2008). The FBI only requires that candidates have a "degree" in engineering or physical
science in order to qualify as an expert in those areas. Id.
98 Enforcement Assessment, supra note 78, at 40. The Committee specifically noted that
"authorities may not have the necessary expertise or resources to investigate and prosecute
technical issues." Id.
99 Probable cause is the standard of proof necessary for the issuance of an arrest warrant.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Police officers in numerous jurisdictions have the power to arrest an
offender with or without an arrest warrant, provided that he or she has probable cause.
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patent. Agents may be able obtain a judicial determination of probable
cause from a magistrate prior to arresting an alleged patent infringer,' 0 0 but
then we revert back to the first problem; namely that judges may not have
the time to acquaint themselves with the intricacies of the subject matter
10
relating to a patent infringement suit. 1
E. Patent Litigation is Expensive
Some argue that patent litigation would be affordable if it were dealt
with by the criminal justice system. 10 2 Accordingly, addressing patent
infringement in this matter "would not be entirely out of line with the
American trend of celebrating inventor heroes and punishing those who
seek to gain an unfair advantage." 10 3 Although patent litigation is rare,
$4.33 billion dollars are spent annually in order for inventors to obtain
patents. 104
Moreover, many scholars argue that the PTO is rationally ignorant
because the financial resources needed in order to validate a patent are too
great.10 5 Can criminal courts afford to be rationally ignorant, given that if it
finds a patent to be valid (because the cost of validating it is too great), an
alleged infringer must go to prison? Ghosh observes that "[i]n order to have
an optimal patent system,... the role of courts in policing their use...
must be defined." 10 6 The social cost should be considered. 10 7 It seems that
patent litigation is expensive, both financially and socially, and as such,
litigation should not take place in criminal courts.
F.

A SignificantPercentageof Patents Are Revoked in the Course of
PatentLitigation

also

As stated earlier, the interaction between the inventor and the PTO,
known as patent prosecution, "involves office actions and

KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 294 (11 th ed. 2005). Probable cause is

defined as requiring a "substantial probability that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested committed it." Id. This may be problematic if the officers or federal
agents do not have a technical background that would help them determine if a person
infringed a patent.
100 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 99, at 8. In order to obtain a warrant, the police officer or
agent must seek- the approval of a magistrate. Id.
101 See supra Part II.A.
102 Borland, supra note 22, at 197.
103 Id. at 197-98.
104 GHOSH ETAL., supra note 4, at 354.
105 See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 5 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1495 (2001).
106 GHOSH ETAL., supra note 4, at 355.
107 Id.
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rejections."' 10 8 This process "eventually determines what the inventor must
disclose and what exclusionary rights are granted to him." 10 9 Ghosh argues
that the requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112 are the most important in the
disclosure process.' 1 ° Given the stringent writing requirements, many
patent challenges arise during "interferences," where one party interferes in
the other's patent prosecution by arguing that he was the first to invent the
claims at issue."' 1 In other words, an interference can help determine
whether or not a person infringed upon another's patent because the process
helps determine who invented the subject matter in question.'12
Additionally, in 2002 less than two percent of 7,445 disputes concerning
intellectual property (of which approximately 2,700 were patent related' 13)
resulted in a trial verdict. 114 Needless to say, many patent infringement
cases are resolved prior to the trial stage, either during the patent
prosecution or before a jury verdict is rendered. Although prosecutors have
the power to plea bargain, 1 15 several pre-trial and early trial dispositions
available in civil court would no longer be available because patent
infringement cases would be dealt with in criminal court.
For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides several
"methods for dismissing cases." 1 16 Sometimes, a plaintiff may wish to
voluntarily dismiss a case without prejudice before a defendant files an
answer with the court. 1 17 Yet when a prosecutor decides to prosecute, she
does so on the behalf of the citizens of the state, 1 18 and when the
government decides to prosecute someone for a criminal offense, a victim
19
may not simply recant; the defendant has the right to confront him. 1
In addition, the Federal Rules allow for a party to move for what is
known as a directed verdict, or "judgment as a matter of law." 12 This
allows the court to "grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against
[a] party on a claim," provided that the "party has been fully heard on an

108 Id. at 316.
109 Id.
110 Id.

III See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006).
112 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 271.
113 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT, supra note 89.
114 Idat I.
115 Donald Dripps, CriminalJustice Process, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIM. JUST. 362, 36469 (2002), reprintedin JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 5 (5th ed. 2004).
116 STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 446 (2d ed. 2004). The examples cited
herein are clearly not exhaustive; they are illustrative.
117 FED. R.Civ. P. 41(a)(l).
118 N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, POLICE STUDENT'S
(2004) (on file with author).
119 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
120 FED.

R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)(B).
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issue during a jury trial." 12 1 Furthermore, the moving party can do so any
time before the issue is submitted to the jury. 12 2 This may allow a party to
circumvent a person's right to a jury trial in civil court by not having the
court submit the issue to a jury. 12 3 Although the dissenters in Galloway
argued that this case contributed to "the gradual process of judicial erosion"
of the Seventh Amendment, 124 the fact remains that it is used in litigation as
a strategic maneuver, and if patent infringement were criminalized, it would
no longer be viable because in criminal court an accused has the right to a
jury trial. 12 5 The Supreme Court ruled in 1968 that a "trial by jury in
126
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice."'
Finally, the Federal Rules also allow for a party to move for judgment
as a matter of law even after the jury has reached a verdict. 127 This may
allow for the jury determination to stand, a new trial, or the court to "direct
the entry of judgment as a matter of law." 128 This strategy would also have
to be done away with if patent infringement were deemed a criminal act
12 9
because a defendant is entitled to a trial by jury.
G. Ambivalent or Conflicting Attitudes About the Protection ofIPRs
Willful copyright infringement in the United States is considered a
criminal act, 130 and Congress has imposed severe penalties for those who
are found guilty of infringing copyrights, including copyrighting for
profit, 13 1 copywriting a work with no motive to profit, 132 the distribution of
pre-release copyrighted works, 133 using technology that circumvents antipiracy protection, 134 counterfeiting labels, documentation and packaging of
136
and "camcording."' 137
copyrighted works, 13 5 creating bootleg recordings,
R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2).
123 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 389-90 (1943).
124 Id. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting).
125 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The right to a jury trial is, however, limited to non-petty
offenses where the sentence imposed by the court may be six months or more. Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970).
126 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
127 FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(3).
128 FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
129 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62.
121

FED.

122

FED.

130

17 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).

§ 506(a)(1)(A).
132 § 506(a)(1)(B).
133 § 506(a)(1)(C).
134 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006). This statute is generally referred to as the "Digital
Millennium Copyright Act." ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 1, at 662.
135 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2006).
136 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2006).
137 18 U.S.C. § 2319B(a) (2006).
131
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Many of these criminal acts carry with them harsh penalties. 138 Moreover,
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act penalizes those who intentionally traffic
counterfeit goods and services. 139 Trademark counterfeiters also face harsh
penalties, including fines not to exceed $2 million, ten years in prison or
both. 140 Even the theft of a trade secret enjoys protection through criminal
measures. 141 Yet patent infringement, as was previously noted, has not been
criminalized in the United States. 142 Scholars hypothesize that this is
because many patents are found to be invalid. 14 3 Another possible
explanation is that U.S. corporations are frequently involved in patent
144
infringement disputes, thus exerting their influence upon such suits.
Either way, one thing is certain: there is an inherent ambivalence in how the
United States helps protect IPRs.
H. GeneralLevel of Criminality
The Committee found that "[l]egislatures, the prosecution and courts
have to prioritize their work," and that "IP crimes do not, as a rule, rate high
especially in high-crime communities. ' ' 14 5 The FBI noted that in 2002, there
were approximately a total of 11,877,218 offenses committed in the United
States. 146 Approximately 1,426,325 of these crimes were considered
"violent." 14 7 Of these violent crimes, the Department of Justice prosecuted
approximately 279 murders, 315 rapes, and 2,070 robberies. 14 8 Given that
violent crimes are considered to be the most serious by experts, 14 9 patent
138 Bootlegging recordings of live musical performances, for example, carries with it a
maximum penalty of five years in prison (ten years for a second offense) and a $250,000
fine. § 2319A(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3). The infringing material can also be subject to
forfeiture and destruction in civil or criminal court. § 2319A(b).
139 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006).
140 § 2320(a).
141 The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 provides criminal penalties for the theft of
trade secrets. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2006). Stealing a trade secret in order to benefit a foreign
government may be punishable by a fifteen year prison term and a $500,000 fine. Id. A
corporation or other offending organization may be fined up to $10 million. Id. In addition,
the commercial theft of a trade secret is punishable by a maximum penalty of ten years in
prison and a $250,000 fine. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3).
142 ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 1, at 663.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Enforcement Assessment, supra note 78, at 41.
146

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES

9 (2002),

available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/pdf/02crime.pdf [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME
REPORT].
147 Id. at 15. Violent crime consists of "murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault." Id. Moreover, violent crimes are those which involve
the use of "force or the threat of force." Id.
148 FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 88, at 28.
149 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, supra note 146, at 9.
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infringement will most likely not be a priority for the federal criminal
justice system. 150
I.

Poor DiscretionaryChoices on Behalf of the Government

The Committee held that "poor discretionary decisions" are
"sometimes based on insufficient information." 1 5 1 Assuming that federal
prosecutors have the technical or scientific background necessary to
properly examine the subject matter of a patent and the accompanying
allegation of infringement, the idea that prosecutors exercise sound
discretion has been widely criticized in recent years.1 52 Generally speaking,
federal U.S. Attorneys have "prosecutorial discretion." 15 3 This power is
considered to be a very important component of the criminal justice process
because prosecutors can screen out those suspects that are in fact innocent
of a crime, as well as decide what criminal charges are appropriate. 154
Among many things, a prosecutor must determine whether there is enough
evidence to prosecute an accused, whether there are compelling reasons not
to prosecute an accused and what charges to file if she decides to prosecute
an alleged offender. 155 But given that a prosecutor's decision to prosecute
an individual may be swayed by either their personal beliefs or political
views, 156 how can we ignore the possibility that a prosecutor may be
1 57
swayed by financial gain?
Who Should Be ProsecutedCriminally?

J.

Deciding to criminally prosecute any given individual may be
problematic for the government because (1) it may be difficult to determine
who has priority (i.e., who was the first inventor that can file charges
against an infringer), and (2) it may be difficult to determine who is

150 The only property crimes experts deem serious are burglary, larceny, and vehicle

theft. See id.
151Enforcement Assessment, supra note 78, at 41.
152 Some argue that a prosecutor may elect to prosecute a person he believes should be
prosecuted, rather than a person who must be prosecuted. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal
Prosecutor,31 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940-1941). Others allude to the notion that
a prosecutor's decision to prosecute or not prosecute an offender may subvert the legislative
process. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 290-91 (1968). Packer

notes that "Iflor the rough approximation of community values that emerges from the
legislative process there is substituted the personal and often idiosyncratic values of the law
enforcer." Id.
153 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 99, at 975.
154 Id. at 977.
155 Id.
156

Jackson, supra note 152, at 5.

157 As Abbott pointed out, "U.S. Corporations are frequently involved in patent disputes."

ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 1, at 663.
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infringing the patent of another in cases of indirect infringement (where
infringement is determined by the application of the doctrine of
equivalents).
1. Priority. As discussed earlier, many patents are challenged through
an administrative procedure known as an "interference." 158 Determining
who the first inventor is, however, may be a long and arduous process, and
159
there are several factors that may affect the determination of priority.
These include the intentional suppression of an invention, inferential
suppression or concealment, spurring and reducing an invention to practice
before another inventor. 160 In Fujikawa, an overseas inventor (Fujikawa)
appealed a decision made by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(Board), which granted priority of invention over a "compound and method
for inhibiting cholesterol biosynthesis in humans and other animals" to
another inventor (Wattanasin). 16 1 In upholding the Board's decision, 162 the
court examined several arguments made by Fujikawa regarding the
aforementioned factors.
a. Intentional Suppression or Concealment. First, Fujikawa (the

senior inventor) argued that Wattanasin intentionally suppressed his
invention. 16 3 According to the court, intentional suppression "requires more
than the passage of time." 164 It "requires evidence that the inventor
intentionally delayed filing [the patent application] in order to prolong the
period during which the invention is maintained in secret," and Fujikawa
failed to provide such evidence. 165 The court noted, however, that
Wattanasin was not "overly efficient in preparing [his] patent application,"
in that he filed the patent application more than a year and a half after he
reduced the invention to practice, thus maintaining his invention a secret for
that seventeen-month period. 16 6 Despite the lapse of time, however, the
court held "that Wattanasin did not intentionally suppress . . . [his]
16 7
invention."

If patent infringement were criminalized, the difficulty in determining
158 GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 271; see also discussion supra Part I.F.
159 See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1563-69 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

160 See id. at 1567-71.
161 Ftuikawa, 93 F.3d at 1561.
162 ]d. at 1571.
163 Id. at 1567. An inventor intentionally suppresses her invention when she "withholds
her invention from the public" indefinitely with the intention to profit from having withheld
it. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
164
165
166
167

Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1567.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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who has priority over an invention in this context may lead to disastrous
results. For example, an inventor who is found to have priority over another
may decide to press criminal charges against the other, even though the
only reason the alleged infringer worked on the protected subject matter in
the first place was because the "victim" (the senior inventor) intentionally
suppressed or concealed his work, thus not revealing himself as the first
inventor. But as the Fujikawa case indicates, even where an inventor
suppressed his work for a seventeen-month period, he may still have
priority. 168 Thus, the alleged infringer may be incarcerated simply because
the first inventor suppressed or concealed his work from the public. 169 The
first inventor did not put anyone, let alone the alleged infringer, on notice
that he was working on the subject matter. Therefore, he should not be able
to accuse anyone of infringement, nor should anyone be charged with
infringement.
b. InferentialSuppression or Concealment. Second, Fujikawa also
argued that suppression and/or concealment could have been inferred
because Wattanasin was spurred to file a patent application shortly after a
third party was issued a patent which encompassed subject matter similar to
his. 170 The court recognized that "[e]vidence that a first inventor was
spurred to disclose by the activities of a second inventor has always been an
important factor in priority determinations because it creates an inference
that, but for the efforts of the second inventor, 'the public would never have
168 Id. at 1569.

169 In these cases, it may be possible for an alleged infringer to raise the affirmative
defense of mistake of fact. Affirmative defenses require that the defendant prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the defense he or she is raising at trial. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 25.00 (2004). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
A person may not be guilty of a crime under the mistake of fact defense when "he commits
an act or omits to act under an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of certain facts
and circumstances which, if true, would make such an act or omission lawful." People V.
Bray, 124 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914 (Ct. App. 1975) (quoting CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CRIMINAL

4.35

(THE COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL OF THE SUPERIOR

COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAL. 2003)). The Model Penal Code states that ignorance

or mistake of fact is a defense to a crime if it either negates the mental elements of an
offense (i.e., purpose, knowledge, recklessness or criminal negligence), or if "the law
provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a
defense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In cases where
there are priority issues and a person is charged with patent infringement, the alleged
infringer should be allowed to prove that he mistakenly believed that the subject matter in
question was not in the process of being patented because he did not know that the subject
matter was being concealed or suppressed. Therefore, he acted in the belief that what he was
doing was lawful, and he, therefore, did not possess the intent or knowledge required to
infringe the patent. This would show that he did not have the requisite mental state. The
second defense (i.e., if the law provides for such a defense) is also plausible, if Congress
were to pass the appropriate legislation.
170 Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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gained knowledge of [the invention].,,,17 1 Yet the court concluded that it
72
would not address third party spurring in the present case. 1
Spurring of any kind may also pose significant problems if patent
infringers were arrested and charged in criminal court. The court recognized
that spurring usually involves two rival inventors, each of whom claims
they have the right to patent an invention. 17 3 The court also noted that the
"[r]esolution of this question could well be affected by the fact that one of
the inventors chose to maintain his invention in secrecy until disclosure by
174
another spurred him to file."
Let us suppose that inventor "A" chose initially not to release his
invention to the public, and that he was later spurred to do so only after his
rival, inventor "B," was close to disclosing the invention herself. Let us
suppose further that inventor A then decided to press criminal charges
against inventor B for patent infringement, given that B copied elements of
A's work (since B, unbeknownst to herself, began working on the invention
A was secretly working on). It follows, then, that B would be convicted of
patent infringement, even though inventor A did not place anyone on notice
that he was working on the subject matter in question, 175 inventor B
happens to be inventor A's rival, 176 and inventor B did not have the
requisite mens rea for the offense of infringement. 177 In other words,
inventor B will be convicted, not because he acted with the intent to
infringe or knowledge that he was infringing inventor A's patent, but
because inventor A intentionally withheld the disclosure of the subject
matter for his own financial gain.
17' Id.(quoting Brokaw v. Vogel, 429 F.2d 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
172 Id. at 1568.

173Id. at 1567 (quoting Brokaw v. Vogel, 429 F.2d 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
174 Id. at 1567-68.
175 See supra Part Il.J.l.b.
176 Inventor A, then, would be considered an "interested witness" who "has a direct and
private interest in the matter at issue." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1633 (8th ed. 2004).
177 Generally speaking, statutory criminal
offenses require that defendants have
"awareness of some circumstance or the likelihood of some harmful result." KAPLAN ET AL.,
supra note 115, at 158. A person is culpable for his actions if he acts purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft
1962). Additionally, some federal courts have held that a statutory crime that is unknown to

the common law and subjects a defendant to severe criminal penalties (including damage to
his reputation) must require the prosecution to prove that the defendant acted with the
requisite culpable mental state (mens rea or scienter, as it is often referred to). See, e.g.,
United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the felony
provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was unconstitutional because it allowed for
severe criminal penalties without proof of the mental state needed to commit the crime).
However, it must be noted that some criminal offenses are treated as strict liability offenses,
and therefore do not require the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with the requisite
mens rea. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 115, at 164. 1 doubt, however, that willful patent
infringement, indirect or otherwise, would be classified as a strict liability offense.
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c. The First to Reduce an Invention to Practice. Finally, determining
which inventor was the first person to reduce an invention to practice,
thereby establishing priority of invention, may affect who should be
prosecuted criminally for patent infringement. As stated earlier, Wattanasin
was working on compounds that helped inhibit cholesterol levels.17 8 The
court noted that Wattanasin's work was composed of in vitro 179 and in
vivo 180 testing. 18 1 When he conducted tests in vitro, the results indicated
that the compounds tested would yield positive results if the tests were to be
conducted in vivo.182 Despite these results, however, Wattanasin's superiors
ceased experimentation for a period of almost two years. 183 After this
hiatus, Wattanasin's superiors renewed their work by conducting more
testing in vitro, and the most promising compounds were subjected to in
vivo testing. 184 All the while Wattanasin's superiors contemplated whether
85
or not the compounds should be patented. 1
Ultimately, the problem with reducing experimentations and
inventions to practice is that the process may be time consuming and
laborious. 186 Moreover, the decision to continue working on a given subject
matter may depend on the availability of funds, and funding, in turn,
depends upon whether or not "additional research might yield valuable
patent rights."' 18 7 Therefore, the process of determining the first inventor
depends upon many variables (i.e., the difficulties inherent in the
experimentation process, funding and the prospective procurement of patent
rights), and finding someone guilty of infringement simply because they are
not deemed to be the first inventor may be incongruous with two of the
18 8
most basic rationales for punishing criminals.

178 Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1561.
179 In vitro is defined as "outside the living body and in an artificial environment."
MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 385 (11 th ed. 2004).
180 In vivo is defined as "[w]ithin a living organism or body." C.C. LEE, ENVIRONMENTAL
ENGINEERING DICTIONARY 403 (4th ed. 2005).
181 Fujikawa, 93 F.3d at 1561-62.
182 Id.at 1561.
183

Id.

184 Id.at 1561-62.
185 Id.at 1562.
186 See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting the "two

phases" that were required in order to determine whether certain compounds inhibited
cholesterol).
187 Id.at 1569.

188 There are two basic rationales for punishing criminals. John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 THE PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955). Criminals are punished either because wrongdoing
merits punishment (the retributive view), or because punishing the criminal effectively
promotes the interests of society (i.e., utilitarian view). Id.These concepts will be discussed
in further detail later in this work. See infra Part III.N.
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2. The Difficulty in Determining the Guilty Party ifthe Alleged
Infringer is Accused of Indirect Infringement. As discussed earlier, indirect
infringement involves the process of ascertaining the different elements of
an infringing invention in order to determine if the elements being used by
the alleged infringer are in fact equivalent to the elements claimed by the
inventor, which are protected by the issuance of the patent.' 8 9 The policy
rationale for the adoption of the doctrine of equivalents is that permitting
the "imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal
detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow
and useless thing."' 190 In other words, not using the doctrine of equivalents
in order to determine infringement would deprive the patentee "the benefit
of his invention." 19 1 Therefore, the inventor would have no incentive to
92
disclose his invention and may conceal it. 1
The process for determining infringement under these circumstances,
however, may be difficult for two reasons. First, the trial judged visited
laboratories, viewed motion pictures, and heard the testimony of many
experts for approximately three weeks. 193 As it was previously discussed in
this section, many inventors, including rivals, may be working on the
subject matter at the same time. 194 There are difficulties and expenses that
may be incurred in determining the first inventor, and because it is difficult
to ascertain who is currently working on protected subject matter, it may
prove difficult to determine the guilty party in a criminal prosecution for
patent infringement.
K. The Role of the Complainant
In patent law, the patent owner is the person who initiates a claim for
patent infringement. 195, However, it is often the prosecutor who decides to
charge a suspect in the criminal law. 196 She then drafts the charging
instrument (also known as a complaint), and the victim signs it under oath

189 See supra Parts IL.C, I1I.B.
190 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
19' Id.
192 Id.
193 ld.at 611.
194 See Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the

interplay between competitive inventors and the appropriate methods used to protect
inventions).
195 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). See also Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559,
1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the real parties in interest were the assignees of both the
plaintiff and the defendant, thus allowing them to initiate a patent infringement suit).
196 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 99, at 10. In many jurisdictions, all arrests are screened
by the prosecutor, and no charges are filed unless the prosecutor approves of them. Id. at 10.
Robert H. Jackson notes that "[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and
reputation than any other person in America." Jackson, supra note 152, at 3.
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(thus becoming the complainant). 197 The prosecutor is granted this great
power because the public wishes to eliminate crime and preserve American
traditions. 198 In other words, it is the prosecutor's duty to charge an alleged
criminal on behalf of the public. 199 Yet if patent infringement were
criminalized, this noble goal may be tainted by the fact that a patentee who
wishes to press criminal charges upon an alleged infringer has a financial
stake in the matter.
As discussed earlier, inventors spend about $4.33 billion dollars
annually in order to patent their inventions. 20 0 More importantly, an
inventor incurs many costs while obtaining the information necessary to
2
collect, produce and comprehend the subject matter she is working on. 01
Although the costs are great, an inventor undertakes the task of inventing
something because she is given the right to exclude others, thereby
controlling the invention's use. 20 2 Having control over her invention is very
important, since it allows her "to prevent others from producing or
implementing the invention at a lower cost." 20 3 The incentive to invent,
then, stems from the fact that she is "free to charge the price necessary to
recover her research and development costs." 204 Because the costs incurred
during creation and litigation are great, it is incumbent upon an inventor to
allege infringement if someone (albeit lawfully) uses her invention or the
20 5
protected elements therein, and this makes her an interested party.
Therefore, the inventor's motive for alleging that someone infringed her
patent becomes quite suspect, and that would damage her credibility as a
complainant.

197 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 99, at 11. The investigating police officer may also sign

the complaint, noting that "the allegations in the complaint are based on 'information and
belief."' Id. Once the complaint is filed, a magistrate then reviews the arrest in an ex parte
proceeding in order to determine if the police had probable cause to arrest the suspect. Id. at
12. The defendant then appears in court for the first time so that bail may be set, and this
appearance is followed by a preliminary hearing where all of the parties are present and by a
grand jury review if necessary. Id. at 12-15. Finally, the complaint is filed and is
subsequently replaced either by an indictment (a charging instrument issued by the grand
jury that is required for felony prosecutions) or by an information (if grand jury review is not
required). Id. at 15. A grand jury review is not required by all American jurisdictions. Id.
Some scholars note that "[a]bout half the states and the federal government require grand
jury indictment in felony cases." KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 115, at 3.
198 Jackson, supra note 152, at 3.
199 See id.
200 See supra Part III.E.
201 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretationand Information Costs, 9 LEwiS
& CLARK L. REV. 57, 57 (2005).
202 Id. at61.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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L. Pleas
In addition to the costs inventors may incur as a result of conducting
2 06
experiments and prosecuting patents, the legal process itself is costly.
Posner recognized that the time of the lawyers, judges, jurors, and witnesses
all increase the overall cost of the judicial process. 20 7 As such, the goal
should be to reduce these costs, 20 8 and settlement costs, according to
Posner, "are normally much lower than litigation costs." 209 As a result, the
number of cases that are resolved through settlements helps determine "the
2 10
total direct cost of legal dispute resolution."
The criminal law also provides for a settlement process of sorts: plea
bargaining. 2 1 1 Plea bargaining is the process by which a prosecutor decides
to charge a defendant with a lesser offense (i.e., one that reduces the
seriousness of the charge and the amount of prison time served) in
exchange for the defendant's waiver of his right to trial and a plea of guilty
to the lesser charge. 2 12 In addition to plea bargains regarding the acceptance
of lesser charges, the prosecutor and the defendant may form agreements
where the prosecutor will refrain from seeking the maximum penalty for a
given offense, as well as agreements where he may not make any
recommendations at a sentencing hearing. 2 13 Finally, pleas may also
"relieve the prosecution and the defense ... from 'the inevitable risks and
' 2 14
uncertainties of trial.'
If patent infringement were criminalized, it follows that the accused
infringer may make use of the aforementioned plea arrangements in order to
avoid some or all criminal liability. However, in cases where the accused
may not be able to avoid all criminal liability, he would be faced with
repercussions that are non-existent if he were forced to settle in civil court.
An example of the perils of taking pleas rests, once again, in the area of
indirect patent infringement.

206 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 401 (1973).
207 Id. Posner also takes into account more basic costs, such as the costs of paper, ink,
court house maintenance, and telephone services. Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 417.
210 Id.
211 People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788-89 (N.Y. 1974) (noting that the plea
bargaining process has existed since 1804 and helps, among other things, to relieve "court

calendar congestion").
212 KAPLAN ETAL., supra note 115, at 5.

213 Dominick R. Vetri, Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to

Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 866 (1964).
214 Selikoff 318 N.E.2d at 788 (quoting

U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE

SOCIETY 135 (1967)).
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As was previously discussed, indirect patent infringement is difficult
to ascertain because of the inherent difficulties in determining which
elements of an invention are equivalent (under the doctrine of equivalents)
to others that were not claimed by the inventor at the time she prosecuted
the patent.215 This remedy is afforded to a patent holder because at the time
the invention was patented, it may not have been foreseeable by the
inventor that the unclaimed elements were, in fact, equivalent to the
claimed ones. 2 16 An alleged infringer, then, may be forced to accept a plea
offer simply because he worked on something that, unbeknownst to him,
was equivalent (but not foreseeable) to an element that was patented by
another.
Suppose, for example, that Albert (an inventor) claims elements A, B,
and C in his patent. Suppose, then, that Maria (another inventor) decides to
work on elements X and Y in order to invent something of her own. It is
later determined that, unknown to Albert when he filed and obtained his
patent from the PTO, element X is similar (or equivalent) to element A, and
element Y is similar (or equivalent) to element B. Therefore, elements X
and Y are considered to be, under the present case law, protected under
Albert's patent (even though he did not claim them initially). 2 17 In civil
law, this is acceptable because to not give patent protection to a patentee
under these circumstances would be to turn "the patent grant into a hollow
and useless thing." 2 18 After all, "[o]utright and forthright duplication is a
dull and very rare type of infringement." 2 19 Yet, if patent law were
criminalized, Maria may be guilty of patent infringement, even though she
may not have the requisite mental state to commit the crime. 2 20 Because
courts have extended the patent's protection from what is claimed to
equivalents (because they perform the same function in the same way and
yield the same result), 22 1 she is forced to either take a plea, or suffer the
perils of going to trial.2 22
215 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741
(2002); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 18-19;
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-09 (1950); Fujikawa v.
Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 44
THE PHIL. REV. 3, 5 (1995); see supra Part II.C, 1I1.B and infra Part III.N.

216 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 738.
217 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950) (holding that a "patentee may invoke" the doctrine of equivalents if his invention and
the infringing invention perform the same function in virtually the same way, and the result
produced is virtually the same).
218 Id. at 607.
219 Id.

220 See supra Part Ill.J.1.b.
221

Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.

222 See, e.g., People v. Selikoff, 318 N.E.2d 784, 789 (N.Y. 1974) (observing that "no
two defendants are quite alike even if they have committed ... identical offenses," and to
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It may be argued that the alleged infringer is not actually forced to
take a plea, but that he knew of the consequences and pled guilty anyway.
Therefore, the plea is valid. This may be true. As Justice Tuttle of the Fifth
Circuit once observed:
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the
court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by
threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment) ...or perhaps
by promises that are by their nature improper as 223
having no proper
relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).
On the other hand, it is highly probable that the plea is not voluntary, given
that under the doctrine of equivalents, any elements that were not
2 24
foreseeable at the time of claiming are still protected by the patent.
M. Double Jeopardy
Criminalizing patent infringement here in the United States may
actually harm patent holders in one very significant way: once a person is
tried and acquitted for an offense, the government is usually barred from
retrying the same person a second time for the same offense. 2 25 This would
be problematic if, for example, an equivalent was found after an alleged
infringer is found not guilty; he could not be tried again for the same crime
(i.e., patent infringement).
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prevents the
government from charging a criminal defendant a second time for the same
offense, once he has been "put in jeopardy of life or limb."'226 The rationale
for this fundamental principle of criminal procedure was eloquently stated
by Justice Black:
The constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy" was designed
to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and

treat them as such would be tantamount to imposing the same punishment for criminals who

may have had different motives for committing the same offense, or were under wholly
different circumstances in the first place).
223 Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
224 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741
(2002); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 18-19;
Graver Tank & Mfg, Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-09 (1950); Fujikawa v.
Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 44
THE PHIL. REv. 3, 5(1995); see supra Part ll.C, I1l.B, l1l.J.l .b, and infra Part I.N.
225 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

226 Id.Furthermore, this concept also applies to the states through the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense ....
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
the
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
22 7
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Additionally, double jeopardy attaches during a jury trial once the jury
has been "empanelled and sworn," 2 28 or during a bench trial once the first
witness is called to the witness stand.2 29 Once it attaches, however, the
230
defendant cannot be tried again for the same offense.
If, for example, an alleged infringer is found to be not guilty (i.e.,
acquitted) during a jury trial, the government cannot file the same criminal
charges against him a second time. 23 1 This would be detrimental to the
patentee if an element used by an acquitted infringer was later discovered,
through further experimentation, to be equivalent to one of the patentee's
claimed elements. Because the infringer was tried and acquitted, the
patentee would not be able to invoke the doctrine of equivalents a second
time in order to have him convicted of patent infringement.
It may be argued that a patent infringer can be tried twice for the same
crime by two different sovereign governments, because "[p]rosecution by
both the state and federal governments is not barred by the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy." 2 32 However, patent law falls squarely
under the jurisdiction of the federal government. 233 Therefore, state
prosecution for patent infringement is highly unlikely.
N. The Policy Rationalesfor Punishing CriminalsMay Be Completely at
Odds with the Policy Goals of IntellectualPropertyLaw
The criminal law imposes punishments that are severe and that
damage the reputation of the person convicted. 234 Yet, as LaFave points
out, "[t]he broad purposes of the criminal law are... to make people do
what society regards as desirable and to prevent them from doing what

227 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
228 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978).
229 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.1 (d) (3d ed. 2007).

230 Id.
231 United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
232 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 230 (4th ed. 2003).

233 U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 8; see infra Part 111.0.
234 United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985).

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWJOURNAL

[Vol 6:1

society considers to be undesirable." 235 As such, it is said that there are two
major rationales for imposing punishment upon criminal conduct:
retributivism and utilitarianism. 23 6 Each may affect the criminalization of
patent infringement, but in two distinctly different ways.
1. Retributivism. The retributivist justification for the punishment of
a criminal is rooted in the belief that his or her behavior is unlawful and
therefore "merits punishment." 23 7 Rawls states that the "retributive view"
of punishment is based on the idea that "[i]t is morally fitting that a person
' 238
who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing."
Therefore, punishment "depends on the depravity of his act." 2 39 Under the
retributivist view of punishing criminality, it may be argued that willful
240
patent infringement merits punishment because it is morally wrong.
First, the low risk involved in stealing intellectual property, coupled with
the financial benefit, invites criminality. 24 1 Second, intellectual property
theft threatens the public health, in that infringers introduce dangerous
counterfeited products into the market. 242 Given the consequences, I am
inclined to agree.
2. Utilitarianism. The second justification for punishing criminals is
based upon utilitarian principles. 2 43 As Rawls points out, the utilitarian
justification for punishing criminals is based on the notion that "bygones
are bygones and that only future consequences are material to present
decisions." 244 To this end, punishment is justified because it is a device that
helps maintain social order. 24 5 Utilitarian theories include, among other
24 6
doctrines, those of rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence.
Rehabilitation seeks to better the criminal in order to "return him to

235
236
237
238

LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 229, at 25-26.
KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 115, at 27.
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 THE PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1955).
Id. at 4-5. Rawls also notes that "The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers

punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not; and it is better

irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him." Id. at 5.
239 Id.
240 Borland, supra note 22, at 197 ("Some commentators have suggested that
reprehensible activities should be dealt with by the criminal system.").
241 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
242 Id.

243 Rawls, supra note 237, at 5.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 See generally KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 115, at 30-52. LaFave also includes
prevention (deterrence of the individual) and education (of the public through the publicity
of a trial) as other justifications for punishment. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 229, at 26, 29.
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society" without having the desire to commit further crimes. 24 7 On the other
hand, incapacitation (also known as restraint) mandates that a criminal be
isolated from society, thus preventing him from committing further
crimes. 24 8 Finally, under the concept of deterrence, a criminal is punished
in the present because it shows other criminals the future consequences of
their criminal actions. 24 9 Of these justifications, deterrence seems to be the
model that is most at odds with the principal goals of intellectual property
and patent law in particular. The problem with applying the deterrence
model of punishment to patent infringement is apparent when viewed in
light of indirect infringement.
As stated previously, there is uncertainty in the claiming process
because the elements claimed by an inventor may have unforeseeable
equivalents at the time he files an application with the PTO.25 ° Yet under
current patent law, these unforeseeable elements are protected by the
patent. 2 5 1 Let us suppose that inventor A, after years of research and
experimentation, was unable to ascertain any elements that were equivalent
to the elements he claimed on his patent application. It would be possible,
then, that inventor B would not be in a better position to ascertain whether
or not an element he is using in his invention is equivalent to the one
claimed by inventor A. But if criminal penalties were imposed in the name
of deterrence, it would (unfortunately) have their intended result: inventor B
would not experiment with the element in question because of the fear that
he may be infringing upon inventor A's patent. Punishing someone for
having allegedly infringed a patent, in this context, may contravene the
central goal of patent law, which is to encourage invention and
25 2
innovation.

247 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 229, at 27.
248 Id.
249 Id.at 28.
250 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002).
See also supra text accompanying note 217.
251 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 738.
252 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229-31 (1964). One author notes

that the United States has not enacted criminal penalties for patent infringement precisely
because it "considers the continuing development of technology and the sciences highly
important," and therefore "encourages inventors to create, improve, and exploit... patented
technologies." Lauren E. Abolsky, Operation Blackbeard: Is Government Prioritization
Enough to Deter Intellectual Property Criminals?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 567, 577 (2004). In fact, some companies advise their employees to "innovate"
because third party patents may be weak, and the risks of challenging the patent are far less
than the reward. Meller, supra note 1, at C4.
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0. ConstitutionalConsiderations
Finally, it is also important to understand that patent law falls under
federal law, 2 53 whereas those powers that are not enumerated in the U.S.
Constitution are reserved for the states. 2 54 In fact, "the Constitution leaves
the general power to prohibit wrongful conduct where it was before its
ratification: in the hands of states." 255 The criminalization of patent
infringement may prove to be yet another point of contention regarding the
principles of federalism. 256 Under what jurisdiction would patent
infringement fall under if it were criminalized?
IV.

INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although there are numerous reasons for not criminalizing patent
infringement in the United States, there are equally compelling reasons that
support its criminalization. Many countries have already criminalized patent
2 57
infringement, thus protecting inventors' IPRs more vigorously.
Additionally, many countries are calling for tougher penalties because of a
perceived misappropriation of intellectual property interests by developing
countries. 25 8 As such, the United States has faced pressure from the
international community to enact stiffer penalties for the enforcement of
25 9
IPRs.
A. Other CountriesAre CriminalizingPatent Infringement
It has been argued that intellectual property is "allied" to a nation's
economic objectives. 2 60 As one scholar dictates indicates, "[i]ntellectual
property is one of the biggest contributors to American economic
growth."'26 1 Moreover, "[t]echnology is bringing the international
community together." 26 2 It is apparent that "[w]orks of the mind ... are
253 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also supra note 233 and accompanying text.
254 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
255 Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

429, 493 (2003-2004).
256 As Barnett points out, there are "two ways of construing state power": some view that

because the state is a "government of 'general powers,' [it] may do all that is not expressly
prohibited by the express provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 429-30. The other view,
however, is that "because governments with unlimited power are a form of tyranny, some
limits to the powers of states must be identified." Id.
257 See infra Part III.A.
258 See infra Part II.B.
259 See infra Part III.C.
260 W.R. Cornish, The International Relations of Intellectual Property, in
GLOBALIZATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, 5 (Alexandra George ed., 2006).

261 Abolsky, supra note 252, at 567.
262 ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 1, at I.
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used and enjoyed in all countries around the globe." 26 3 As Abbott
eloquently stated:
The business sector functions globally, collecting and assembling
inputs from factories and employees around the world, and distributing
products and services to a global consumer. Scientists and
academicians exchange ideas over the Internet and at international
conferences where national identity plays a modest role. Diseases show
limited regard for national borders as pandemic and threats of
pandemic challenge the global public health system. We collectively
share a planetary environment that requires multilateral attention.
Innovation is driving the global economy.264
Many scholars now realize that the protection of intellectual property
is important to international trade. 26 5 Taking in consideration international
trade affects the protection of IPRs, 26 6 several countries have signed The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs Agreement), which provides (in article 61 of the Agreement) that
member states must impose criminal penalties for "wilful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale." 267 The TRIPs
Agreement also allows member states to "provide for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual
property rights," so long as the infringing activity was, again, "committed
wilfully and on a commercial scale." 2 68 Some countries, therefore, have
criminalized patent infringement. Japan, for example, provides for a five
year prison sentence or a fine not to exceed 5,000,000 yen for "[a]ny person
who has infringed a patent right or an exclusive license." 26 9 Furthermore,
2 70
Brazil and Thailand have also criminalized patent infringement.
Colombian authorities have gone as far as raiding a pharmaceutical lab in
an effort to apprehend patent infringers. 27 1 Given that other countries are
263 SHAHID ALIKHAN & RAGHUNATH MASHELKAR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES INTHE 21ST CENTURY 35 (2004).
264 ABBOTT ETAL., supra note 1,at 1.
265 ALIKHAN, supra note 263, at 54.

AND

266 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 15, at 320 (noting in the Agreement's Preamble the
importance of reducing "distortions and impediments to international trade," and promoting
the "effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights").
267 Id. at 345.
268 Id.
269 Patent Law, No. 116 (1994) (Japan), translatedin WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, DATABASE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATIVE TEXTS, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/en/jp/j p006en.pdf.
270 JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INTHE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 351 (2001).
271 Renee M. Fishman, et al., Colombian Attorney General Raids Lab in Patent Case,
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Dec. 2002, at 26.
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enforcing IPRs with criminal penalties, the United States may be inclined to
27 2
follow suit.
B. PerceivedMisappropriationof Intellectual PropertyInterests by
Developing Countries and the Effect of InternationalCooperation
Another concern revolves around the belief that during the 1970s and
1980s, many developing countries were misappropriating the intellectual
property interests of more developed countries. 27 3 The United States, Japan
and the European Union (EU) requested that WIPO intervene because of
this perceived misappropriation, but developing nations demanded
intellectual property reform. 274 Specifically, developing nations demanded
access to technology owned by developed nations. 27 5 Although the United
States, Japan, and the EU demanded stricter enforcement measures, WIPO
was unable to comply. 276 As a result of this "stalemate," the United States
focused its effort to strengthen IPRs by entering into the negotiations which
2 77
eventually led the creation of the TRIPs Agreement.
These events are important, given the spirit of cooperation between
the United States, Japan and the EU. 27 8 The United States has yet to impose
criminal sanctions for patent infringement, but Japan already has, 2 79 and
Europe may not be far behind. 280 Therefore, the United States may decide
to follow suit, lest they risk hampering international trade relations between
2 81
the three.
272 United States acquiescence to international policy in the area of intellectual property
is not without precedent, since the Supreme Court itself recognized that Congress
"rationally" enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act because Congress wished to keep
pace with copyright protection in Europe. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003).
Moreover, countries such as Japan, and Europe as a whole, are now in a better position to

exert pressure over the United States, since they too are "major players" in the creation of
intellectual property. See ALIKHAN, supra note 263, at 38. It is plausible that the United
States may decide to criminalize patent infringement on the basis that during the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations of the World Trade Organization, they struck a "Grand Bargain"
with least developed countries, where the United States promised them "improved terms of
entry" for their agricultural products in exchange for the increased protection of IPRs. RAJ
BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 34 (2008).

However, this still does not take away from the fact that trends in international law play an
important role in how the United States shapes its own laws. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at

205-06.
273
274
275
276
277
278

ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 1,at 3.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

279 See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
281 The Paris Convention, for example, "ensures that patents acquired in signatory
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C. Mounting PressureFrom InternationalOrganizationsand
MultinationalCorporations.
Furthermore, many international organizations have also called for
stiffer penalties for intellectual property infringement. Organizations such
as the World Trade Organization and the WIPO were created in order to
encourage "the use of intellectual property as an integral part of the
international trading system." 2 82 Other organizations, such as the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), are going further and calling
for government intervention. 283 The ICC created the "Business Action to
Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy" in order to bring to light the "full economic
and social costs" of intellectual property theft, thereby making enforcement
of IPRs "a priority on government agendas." 284 Some non-governmental

organizations, then, are requesting more government involvement, and this
may force the United States to criminalize patent infringement.
In addition, multinational corporations have exerted their influence in
the fight to strengthen IPRs in the international community. 28 5 Many
corporations "are the primary driver for stronger intellectual property rights
protection around the world."'28 6 This, too, may also affect whether or not
the United States adopts criminal penalties for patent infringement. EU
corporations, for example, may call on the United States to help enforce the
IPRs of their inventors, and this would be problematic if the United States
fails to impose criminal penalties for patent infringement. After all,
"[c]ountries have a responsibility to implement their international
obligations in national intellectual property laws." 28 7 Therefore, it is
plausible that the United States may decide to adopt criminal sanctions for
countries will provide the same patent protection for patentees regardless of their
nationality." GHOSH ET AL., supra note 4, at 231. The goal here is to "minimize the costs of

obtaining global patent protection for citizens of the signatory nations." Id.
282 ALIKHAN, supra note 263, at 55.
283 Press Release, Int'l Chamber of Commerce, ICC Welcomes Governments' New Anticounterfeiting Agreement and Offers Input (Oct. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/ip/iccbgifi/index.html. Members of the ICC applauded a new
plan for an agreement that "strengthen[s] safeguards against theft and infringement of
intellectual property rights." Id. According to the ICC, the United States, EU, Japan, Mexico,

and Switzerland planned to enact this agreement in order to establish a cohesive mechanism
for enforcing intellectual property. Id. The agreement calls "for better international
coordination, consensus on the best enforcement practices and alignment on provisions of
their legal frameworks to ensure that adequate criminal, civil and border protection measures
are in place." Id.
284 Guy SEBBAN, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Bus. ACTION TO STOP COUNTERFEITING
AND PIRACY,

3rd GLOBAL

CONGRESS ON COMBATING COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY

3 (2007),

available at http://www.ccapcongress.net/archives/Geneva/Files/Sebban.pdf.
285 ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
286 Id.
287 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW

(2002).
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CONCLUSION

Several scholars have suggested strategies that may help better protect
IPRs. One such approach calls for "global neoliberalism." 28 9 Global
neoliberalism entails the removal of "the heavy hand of government
regulation" from "efficient private markets." 290 Another similar solution is
for companies to "establish compliance standards" for their employees, thus
reducing the need for government intervention. 29 1 Although international
pressure is growing rapidly, criminalizing patent infringement here in the
United States is not the answer.

288

It is important to note, once again, that the United States has acquiesced to

international pressure in this area before. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003).
289
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290 Id. at 121-22. Richards does acknowledge that many nations

have not seen economic
growth despite enacting these reforms, but this has not dissuaded advocates of the theory. Id.
It should also be noted that some form of legislation may still be required in order to
"combat corruption, promote efficiency and transparency, and increase the protection of
property." Id.
291 Ray K. Harris & James D. Burgess, Compliance Planning for Intellectual Property
Crimes, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. I, 26 (2003). Specifically, they advocate that companies
should create codes of conduct that "educate employees about how to avoid violations that
may occur because of the nature of the company's business." Id.

